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Abstract: This paper discusses the rule of apostasy and its 
impact on the apostate’s legal status. It investigates how 
Indonesian Islamic family law administers the commit of 
apostasy and how it would determine the apostate’s legal 
status on his or her marriage and his or her right to custody 
of child in particular. Deploying socio-legal approach it 
observes how Muslim judges resolve familial cases related 
to apostasy at court and to what extent their legal decisions 
on these issues are shaped by the majority of religious 
authorities’ and their owm understanding of the Islamic 
doctrine of religious protection. It argues that while the 
Islamic state law has sought to move away from the 
classical religious rules in the administration of apostasy as 
to protect human rights, judges find it difficult to renounce 
the dogma that Muslims must protect their religion from 
any possible danger other groups of religion would create 
and that the religious protection is often in conflict with the 
realization of the right to religious freedom. 
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Introduction 
Muslims believe that religion is one of the matters that according 
to Islamic doctrine should be protected. Although interpretation on 
how religion should be protected differs, many view and agree that 
protection should be made when religion is endangered. The 
protection of (Islamic) religion is clearly stressed in the issue of the 
practice of apostasy. For a Muslim who turns his or her faith to 
another religion and looses his or her faith for no religion, rules are 
introduced to protect the (Islamic) religion itself. 
Under Islamic law, apostasy is deemed to be a crime and is, based 
on Sunna (Prophetic Tradition), punished by death. Basically none of 
verses dealing with apostasy provides for the penality of apostasy in 
this life, but they condemn it in a very harsh term.3 As Cook argued, 
although such death punishment is not certain when it became 
normative particularly referring to the early Abbasid times, it is the 
accepted punishment in the early stage of Islam.4 In regard with the 
issues of family, when an apostate is a married person, the punishment 
would relate to his or her status of marriage and extends to other 
matters, including his or her right to guardianship, custody, and 
inheritance. The classical Islamic law has devoted its discussion to 
these issues very lengthly. Indonesia has adopted Islamic law as one 
element enriching its national laws and puts a number of articles to 
administer the issue of apostasy. Although the Indonesian law has 
reformed its rules related to the issue, the classical Islamic texts remain 
the main reference among judges when dealing with it. 
A number of works have been written to discuss the issue of 
apostasy in both general and specific scopes. Taking Sudan as an 
object of his study Abdullahi Ahmed al-Na’im discusses the Islamic 
law of apostasy and relates it to the modern applicability.5 He argues 
that the shari’a law of apostasy is inconsistent with and violates the 
principle of religious freedom. Reform is thus needed ‘to maintain the 
negative civil law consequences of apostasy’.6 Cook discusses apostasy 
                                                                
3 Peters and Devries, ‘Apostasy in Islam’, Die Welts des Islams, 1 at 5 etseq (1976), p. 77. 
4 David Cook, “Apostasy from Islam: A Historical Perspective”, JSAI, 31 (2006), p. 
276. 
5 Abdullahi Ahmed al Na’im, ‘The Islamic Law of Apostasy and Its Modern 
Applicability: The Case from Sudan’, Religion, 16 (1986): pp. 197-224. 
6 Ibid., p. 216. 
 
 
 
Muslim’s Marital Life in Indonesia 
91 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 10, Number 01, June 2016 
using historical sources and examines a number of conversion cases 
and reasons for Muslims to convert. He notes that there had been 
changes over centuries about the ways in which apostates acted and he 
concludes that for several reasons Muslims’ attitudes toward apostasy 
did not develop until the Abbasid time.7 
In Indonesian context the discussion of the issue of apostasy in 
Indonesia has been also done in a number of works. Natalia 
Laskowska, for instance, discusses  fatwas on death penalty on 
apostates and on Ahmadiya case and argues that in practice it seems 
rare that the apostates were punished and were instead considered to 
have incited hatred.8 In its report on the the impact of blasphemy laws 
on minority rights in Indonesia, Freedom House argues that the laws 
are often vaguely worded and are abusedly implemented.9 Despite this 
fact, only have very few papers been written concerning the 
relationship between the issue of apostasy and Islamic family law 
problems in Indonesia. Among the papers are those written by two 
judges of Islamic courts, Mukti Arto and Fachruddin. Arto discusses 
the procedure of Islamic judiciary and deals with divorce proceedings 
particularly those petitioned under the ground of apostasy.10 
Employing a similar approach, Fachruddin observes the issue of 
apostasy as one of divorce grounds listed in the Kompilasi Hukum 
Islam di Indonesia (Indonesia’s Compilation of Islamic Law). He 
argues that there has been vagueness in the regulation on divorce 
grounds and mentions that the grounds listed do not support to each 
other and they are overlapped and confusing.11 He criticized the 
Kompilasi Hukum Islam for limiting the practice of apostasy to be  
used for divorce petition and views that to be taken as a ground of 
divorce apostasy should not be restricted by the condition of 
disharmony resulted from apostasy. To him, difference of religion 
itself is a disharmony within marital life. 
                                                                
7 Cook, ‘Apostasy from Islam, p. 277. 
8 Natalia Laskowska, ‘Apostasy as a Tool to Suppress Dissent: Indonesian Perspective’, 
in Orientalist, 2 (2012), pp. 74-84.  
9 Freedom House, Policing Belief: The Impact of Blasphemy Laws on Human Rights, A 
Freedom House Special Report, October 2010.  
10 Mukti Arto, Praktek Perkara Perdata pada Pengadilan Agama (Yogyakarta: Pustaka 
Pelajar, 1996). 
11 Fachruddin, ‘Murtad sebagai Alasan Perceraian dan Implementasiya di Pengadilan 
Agama’, in Mimbar Hukum, 39, 9 (1998), pp. 12-18. 
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There have been some other discussions on the issue of apostasy 
related to marital affairs. Ratno Lukito in his book Hukum Sakral dan 
Hukum Sekuler discusses the issue of faith difference and its connection 
with the practice of inheritance. He argues that there has been wider 
interpretation of the rule of inheritance within Muslim judges.12 
Previously Lukito wrote also an article entitled ‘The Enigma of Legal 
Pluralism in Indonesian Islam: The Case ff Interfaith Marriage’and 
observed various legal interpretations of the marriage law. He viewed 
that the government has often been bewildered by the ongoing debate 
itself and left the issue to be dealt with by legal scholars.13 In my 
previous work, I myself have investigated a number of decisions on the 
issue of apostasy in the context of divorce. However, I did not put the 
discussion in a broad context of religious protection but of 
maintenance of fiqh doctrines within Muslim judges of Indonesia.14 
Recently, Muhrisun has published an article investigating the children’s 
welfare within the families involving spouses one of whom commits 
apostasy. He displays rich data on the practice of inter-religious 
marriage and on Muslim judges’ view on such marriage and on their 
preference to dissolving marriage and to dismissing the right to child 
custody from apostates.15 
Although much discussion has been done, only scant attention has 
been paid to the doctrine of religious protection contained in the rules 
of familial issues and in practical decisions issued by Muslim judges. 
Looking at articles prescribed in both the Kompilasi Hukum Islam and 
the Marriage Law of Indonesia relevant Muslim judges decisions, this 
paper discusses the practice of apostasy and its impact on the the 
apostate’s legal status. It investigates how apostasy would determine 
                                                                
12 Ratno Lukito, Hukum Sakral dan Hukum Sekuler: Studi tentang Konflik dan Resolusi dalam 
Sistem Hukum Indonesia (Jakarta: Alvabet, 2008), pp. 437-457. 
13  Ratno Lukito, ‘The enigma of legal pluralism in Indonesian Islam: the case of 
interfaith marriage’, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2008), pp. 176–
187.  
14 Euis Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and 
Legal Practices of the Indonesian Islamic Court (Amsetradam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2010). 
15 Muhrisun Afandi, ‘Apostasy as Gounds in Divorce Cases and Child Custody 
Disputes in Indonesia’, in Noorhaidi Hasan and Fritz Schulze (eds), Indonesian and 
German Views on the Islamic Legal Discourse on Gender and Civil Rights (Germany: Hobert & 
Co, Gottingeng, 2015), pp. 89-107. 
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the apostate’s legal status on his or her marriage and his or her right to 
custody of child. It shall look at how Islamic law in Indonesia regulates 
the issues and how Muslim judges resolve familial cases related to 
apostasy at court and investigate to what extent their legal decision on 
these issues are shaped by their understanding of the doctrine of 
religious protection.  
The data used in this paper are decisions of Islamic court and 
notes from interviews and hearing attendance. The data were gathered 
from two periods of time, from 2004-2006 and from 2011-2012. The 
decsisions collected were read and observed to see the legal reasoning 
of judges when giving their rulings. They were completed by the notes 
from my interviews with judges. Deploying socio-legal approach this 
paper attempts to study how the rules were introduced and how judges 
interpret the rules and apply them in their rulings and why they follow 
or deviate from the rules and how their attitudes are intersected with 
the notion of religious protection. 
Apostasy from Islamic Legal Perspective: It’s Impact on 
Marriage  
Riddah is an Arabic word to denote apostasy, used interchangibly 
with the word irtidad. However, the usage of these two terms has 
different emphasis. While riddah refers to an act of Muslim’s 
conversion to become an unbeliever, irtidad means conversion from 
Islam to other religions such as Christianity. The one who commits 
apostasy is called murtadd.16 When one commits apostasy and he or she 
is in the status of marriage, the question arises on the status of her or 
his marriage. Does the marriage remain valid according to classical 
Islamic legal opinions?  
To answer the above question, the issue of inter-religious marriage 
needs first to be investigated. In order to comprehend the law of inter-
religious marriage, the discussion of pillars and conditions that 
determine the validity of marriage needs to be highlighted. Marriage 
could be conducted and considered to be valid if it meets required 
pillars and each pillar’s conditions. The pillars include spouses (bride 
and groom), marriage contract, guardian, witnesses, and mahr or dowry. 
Each of these requirements must meet certain conditions. As for the 
issue of inter religious marriage, the condition of the pillar of ‘bride 
                                                                
16 Samuel M. Zwemer, The Law of Apostasy in Islam, www.muhammadanism.org., 
February 2, 2004, 33. 
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and groom’ needs to be mentioned and the classical Islamic legal 
doctrine requires that spouses must be free from conditions that would 
prevent them from marrying to each other, i.e., being in the same 
blood lineage, having been fed by a same woman, and having been 
bounded by marital tie of their family member as mother or father in-
law. These conditions are described very clearly in the discussion of 
‘muhharramat’ or groups of female that cannot be married. While these 
three are clear, a question arises on the issue of religion. Is unity in 
faith or religion a condition to be met in Islamic marriage; is a Muslim 
person (male and female) allowed to get married with a non-Muslim 
person (a male of female)?   
Generally speaking, there are three opinions maintained among 
Islamic legal scholars on the issue. First is the opinion that stresses the 
validity of marriage between spouses adhering to Islam. Second is the 
opinion that underlines the possibility of marriage between a Muslim 
man and a non-Muslim woman. Third is the view that accentuates the 
impossibility of marriage between a non-Muslim man and a Muslim 
woman. The legality of marriage between a Muslim man and a non-
Muslim woman is however envisible only under some conditions. The 
conditions are particularly related to the non-Muslim party, the female. 
It is specified that the prospective bride must believe in sacred texts 
called al-kitab or that she must be ahl al-kitab. In this regard, it is noted 
that there are three categories of non-Muslim, i.e., non-Muslim bride 
believing in goods or matreials such as stone, non-Muslim bride 
believing in religion with quasi sacred text such as Majusi, and non-
Muslim bride believing in sacred text called ahlu al-kitab,17 such as 
Christians and Jews. Although few, like Abu Daud, consider inter-
religious marriage between a Muslim man and non-Muslim woman 
with quasi sacred scripture as lawful,18 jurists in general accept only the 
marriage between a Muslim man and non-Muslim woman in the third 
category.19 Jurists, in fact, agreed to outlaw a Muslim man and a 
Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim woman and a non-Muslim 
                                                                
17 Sayyid Sabiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah (Beirut: Da>r al-Fath}i, 1990), p. 13. 
18 ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jaziri, Al-Fiqh ala> madha>hib al-arba‘ah (Beirut: Da>r al-Fikr, 1996), 
p. 61. 
19 See Wahbah Zuhayly, al-Fiqh al-Islāmiy wa Adillatuhu (Damaskus: Da >r al-Fikr, 1984), 
Vol. 10, p. 151. However it must be noted that the allowance of such marriage is for 
Shafi’ite limited to women who hold pure kitab and who have not been contaminated 
by other false doctrines (al-kita>biyah al-kha>lisha).  
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man that believe in materials such as stone and they categorized them 
as musyrik.20 The legal base of their ban is the verse that reads that it is 
forbidden for a Muslim man to marry a Musyrik woman, although she 
attracts you and it is not allowed for a Muslim woman to marry a 
Musyrik man although he interests you a lot (al-Baqarah/2: 5).21 
When the legal opinions of the scholars on the issue of inter-
religious marriage is clear, the above question of whether or not the 
marriage of the couples one of which commits apostasy remains valid. 
Basically, an easy conclusion from the above discussion can be drawn 
to answer the question, implying that marriage maintained by couples 
one of whom becomes apostate is considered legal or valid as long as 
the apostate turns to one of religions with sacred texts. However, the 
question might not be answered so easily and for clear and secure 
discussion on the issue, detailed opinions of the scholars need to be 
explored. In dealing with the status of such marriage, a number of 
questions are put forward in classical fiqh texts like that of Abdu al-
Rahman al-Juzairi who addressed some following questions: is the 
validity of marriage between two spouses annulled provided one of 
them commits apostasy? Is the apostasy committed by bride or groom 
considered similar?  And what are the pronouncements and the deeds 
that would be concluded infidelity or apostasy?22 
The discussion on the status of marriage of apostate spouse puts 
an emphasis on its effect on the validity of marriage. The effect has 
very much depended on the party who commits the appostasy. It 
means that the legal status of marriages where it is the bride that 
commits apostasy will be different from that of the marriage where it is 
the groom who commits apostasy. Hanafites differentiate the legal 
status of marriages where the apostle is bride and where the apostate is 
the groom. They maintained that the marriage is to be annulled directly 
provided the groom (male) commits apostasy. The arguments goes in 
line with the consensus of the sholars that inter-religious marriage is 
only permitted between a Muslim man and a non-Muslim woman and 
they stated that it is impossible for a Muslim bride to be controlled by 
a non-muslim groom. Although they have clear opinion on the above 
case, they proposed three opinions on the case of apostate bride 
                                                                
20 Abu Zahrah, al-Ahwāl al-Syakhsiyyah, (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr, 1957), p. 112. 
21 Ibid., p. 113. See also Wahbah Zuhayly, al-Fiqh al-Islāmiy wa Adillatuhu, p. 151.  
22 al-Jaziri, Al Fiqh ala al-Madhahib al Arba’a, p. 171. 
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(female). First is that the marriage is abrogated in natural apostasy; 
second is the marriage is not abrogated, but it can be taken as a ground 
for dissolving the marriage, and the bride is considered as slave for her 
husband due to her deed. Malikites share the same idea with Hanafites. 
In different way, Shafi’ites and Hanabilites put the consummation of 
marriage as a basis to define the legal status of the marriage, and hence 
differentiate the effect of the apostasy committed before and after 
sexual intercourse. To their views, the marriage is annulled 
automatically if apostasy is committed when sexual intercourse is done. 
Nevertheless, the annulment is not directly completed and its 
ompletion is due to the expiration of waiting period. In other word, 
the marriage is considered to be ‘off’ for some while. The marriage is 
annulled only if the apostate bride or groom remains to stick firmly to 
his act of apostasy. Therefore, the marriage is continued if the apostate 
reconverts to Islam during waiting period.23 
Apostasy within Marriage:  Indonesian Perspective   
Apostasy is a rare practice among Indonesian Muslims in general. 
However, a survey found a number of practices of massive apostasy in 
certain local areas where Christian propagators launched and run their 
missionary activities.24 Sources indicate that, although rare, as stated 
above, conversion between recognised religious groups does occur and 
although it is permitted by law in Indonesia, it remains an extremely 
controversial issue. And while national government respected religious 
freedon and no rule in Indonesian laws about the sanction for Muslims 
committing apostasy is made, the impact or sanction of apostasy to 
marital status is regulated and interfaith relationships and marriages 
continue to be a source of contention. 
Islamic law in Indonesia administers that marriage could be 
conducted only by couples adhering to same religion. The Law of 
Marriage No. 1/1974 that applies to all citizens of Indonesia regardless 
of their religions regulates that marriage could be conducted if it meets 
the requirements specified in the law and fits with their religious 
faith.25 The Kompilasi Hukum Islam, which stands as a substantive law of 
the Islamic court and which applies to only Muslim, sets the same rule. 
                                                                
23 Ibid., p. 54. 
24 Melissa Crouch, Law and Religion: Conflict and the Court in Indonesia’ (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2014). 
25  See the Law of Marriage No. 1/1974.  
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It even stresses through its articles that one of the requirement for 
marriage is the unity of religion. Article 40 clearly administers this and 
states that it is prohibited for a man to marry a woman under certain 
conditions.26 First is the condition where a woman is bound to a 
marriage with a man. Second is the condition where a woman is within 
waiting period after divorce. Third is the condition where a woman is 
not a Muslim. Another article regulates the prohibition of woman to 
marry a non-Muslim man. It says that a Muslim woman is not allowed 
to marry a non-Muslim man. These two articles demonstrate that 
Indonesia, quite different from some other Muslim countries that 
allow a Muslim man to marry non-Muslim woman, forbids inter 
religious marriage of both sides.27 
In line with these regulations, Indonesia therefore regulates that 
conversion might become one of grounds under which marriage 
cannot be maintained. Basically, through the Kompilasi Hukum Islam, 
Indonesia does not automatically dissolve marriage of couple one of 
whom commits apostasy. In fact, the Kompilasi Hukum Islam puts 
apostasy as one of the grounds under which divorce can be petitioned 
at court. This is clearly found in article 116 of the Kompilasi Hukum 
Islam which specifies grounds that could be presented for divorce and 
puts apostasy as one of the grounds as listed in the last point.28 This 
denotes that apostasy has an equal position as other grounds for 
divorce. What is regulated in Indonesia is quite different from what 
Malaysia administers. Malaysia does not regulate that apostasy can 
automatically dissolve marriage and the provision of Law Reform Act 
(Marriage and Divorce) 1976 only acknowledged petition made by non 
Muslim spouse. Therefore, if one spouse has converted to Islam, the 
other party who has not so converted may petition for a divorce. 
When non-Muslim spouse did not file a petition of dissolution of 
marriage, after the other spouse leaves the faith and embraces Islam, 
the marriage will be declared as still valid and legal.29 
                                                                
26 The Kompilasi Hukum Islam, art. 40. 
27 The Kompilasi Hukum Islam, art. 44. 
28 See the Kompilasi Hukum Islam, art. 161.  
29 Jasni bin Sulong, ‘The Impilcation of Religious Conversions toward Muslims’ 
Inheritance under Malaysian Law’, in International Journal of Liberal Arts and Social 
Sciences, 2, 9 (2014), pp. 122-135.  
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Interesting also is that there is an additional clause to the word 
‘apostasy’ in article 116 of the Kompilasi Hukum Islam as to limit the 
apostasy that could be taken as the ground for divorce. The clause 
attached informs that the apostasy that could be taken as ground for 
divorce is the apostasy that results in disharmony within marriage. The 
clause aims to stress that not all apostasy can be brought by a spouse 
to break his or her marriage. It is the apostasy that results in 
disharmony within marriage that can be presented by couple to end 
their marriage. Valuing that what is written in law is to give freedom to 
couples to decide the fate of their marriage, a question arises of 
whether judges follow the rule. In the following section I shall discuss 
the effect of apostasy on the status of marriage in Indonesia. I shall 
also investigate the effect of apostasy on other familial legal issues, 
custody in particular.  
Religious Protection in Indonesian’s Legal Practice: Cases of 
Divorce and Custody  
The doctrine of religious protection is very clear in Islamic legal 
rules. Of the five ultimate goals of the sharia (maqasid al-shari’a) the first 
is religious protection. It is in this context of religious protection that 
the Islamic family law in Indonesia administers the effect of apostasy 
on a Muslim couple’s legal status of marriage and their rights to 
custody. 
Divorce, Inevitable in Faith Disarray? 
The Kompilasi Hukum Islam apparently wanted to place apostasy in 
the same position as the other grounds for divorce mentioned above 
and therefore, as I argued elsewhere, to give the couples the freedom 
to decide whether or not their marriage should continue.30 In so doing, 
it seems that the Kompilasi Hukum Islam does not intend to dissolve a 
marriage at the precise moment one of the parties commits apostasy. 
Religious freedom is assumed to be implemented in this regard and the 
Kompilasi Hukum Islam authorizes relevant parties to decide the fate of 
their marriage. Nevertheless, a number of judges who are inclined to 
refer to the legal doctrine of the fiqh books still consider that a divorce 
between couple automatically occurs at a time when one party in 
marriage commits apostasy and not with the time the divorce decision 
                                                                
30 Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity, p. 157. 
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is issued.31 They also ignore the clause attached in the relevant article 
which stresses the element of disharmony resulting from the act of 
apostasy and therefore are inclined to stress the act of apostasy itself. 
In fact a number of judges viewed that a petition of divorce on the 
grounds of apostasy does not acquire any attempts for reconciliation. 
Mukti Arto, for example, argues that the difference in religious faith 
between the couple will automatically result in disharmony and advises 
that what judges should do is to advise the apostate to return to 
Islam.32 Furtthermore, they strongly suggest that the clause ‘resulting in 
disharmony in the marital life’ attached to the word ‘murtad/apostasy’ 
found in Article 116 (h) be eliminated, as it makes the rule itself vague. 
To them, the essence of the clause has been covered in the same 
Article (116: f), which mentions continuous quarrelling as one of the 
grounds for divorce and argue that should the clause be maintained, 
the aim of Point (h) is obscured; it is apostasy or disharmony to be 
considered. Since they consider that apostasy can stand by itself as 
adequate grounds for the judges to end the marital relationship of a 
couple, they are accordingly not burdened by the necessity of proving 
the evidence of disharmony resulting from the act of apostasy.  
As I discussed elsewhere, one case of apostasy in the religious 
court of Rangkasbitung implies that reconciliation is not to be striven 
for in a divorce sought when one party in marriage has become 
apostate and that the difference of religious faith is the strongest 
motivation which led the judges to comply with the petition. It is 
recorded in the judgment that a man petitioned for divorce because he 
claimed that he had frequent disagreements with his wife, and they had 
been separated since April 2003. It is also recorded that the husband 
admitted since January 2004 to have reverted to his former religion, 
Christianity, which he had embraced before marrying his wife. The 
wife, who contested the husband’s petition, stated that not everything 
her husband had stated was true, and that she still wanted to save her 
marriage although the husband had reverted to his former religion. In 
dealing with this case, the judges decided to terminate the marriage. 
What is of interest is that in their legal considerations they clearly 
emphasize the apostasy of the husband, attested to by the fact that 
since January 2004 the husband had been active in one of the churches 
                                                                
31 Ibid., p. 158. 
32 Ibid. 
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in Rangkasbitung. They then referred to Article 116 (h) of the 
Kompilasi Hukum Islam, which mentions that apostasy constitutes 
one of the valid grounds for divorce. It also cited the legal text from al-
muhadhdhab, Vol. 2, p. 54, which states, “If a couple or one of each 
becomes an apostate, the marriage is to be annulled... if the apostasy 
occurs after a sexual relationship has been commenced, the divorce 
occurs after the expiry of the iddah period.” In giving such a judgment, 
the judges ignore the objection of the wife contesting the husband’s 
petition and had adduced the act of apostasy as the main grounds for 
divorce, whereas it was clear that the apostasy had basically been 
committed after the couple had been involved in arguments for a long 
time and had separated. They did not even seem to consider the 
possibility that, by stating that he had reconverted to Christianity, the 
husband had merely intended to back up his petition and ensure that it 
was granted.  
Records demonstrate that apsotasy has been a popular ground for 
marriage dissolution. In the periods before the Kompilasi Hukum Islam 
and the Marriage Law were issued, many cases demonstrate that the 
judges in the religious courts accepted apostasy as a condition which 
could break up a marriage automatically, a position relevant to the fiqh 
doctrine applied at the time. Many women have reportedly admitted 
that they had committed apostasy to rid themselves of their husbands. 
They took this strategy as women had at that time difficulty to 
pertition for divorce. Their attempts were indeed successful. Pijfer 
recorded some cases in Demak in early 19 century where a number of 
Muslim wives took a strategy of admitting to have converted in order 
to be divorced. Interestingly, as Pijfer noted, their acts were approved 
by some ‘ulama. This phenomenon had led the regent of Demak to 
issue a circular letter discouraging Muslim women to play with the 
word of apostasy.33 The same position was also adopted by judges of 
the religious courts after 1974, which however tends to run counter to 
the Marriage Law, as it does not categorize apostasy into the group of 
the grounds on which the divorce can be granted. This tendency 
continued to strengthen after the issuing of the Kompilasi Hukum Islam 
in which apostasy is considered as a valid ground for, but not 
automatically confirming, the dissolution of a marriage. 
                                                                
33  See C.F. Pijfer, Fragmenta Islamica, Studien over Het islamisme in Nederlandsch-Indie 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1934). See also, Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity, p. 
159 (note 79). 
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Despite that the written law has put apostasy as a private issue 
whose impact could be negotiated by relevant parties, in practical level 
it is considered to be an insult toward religion (Islam) which affects the 
religiosity of others. Therefore, judges thought that as soon as it is 
presented to court by a spouse as a ground for his or her divorce 
petition, apostasy should be treated as automatic ground for divorce 
regardsless of the absence of disharmoniy within couple.34 To them, 
religious difference is disharmony itself and saw therefore disharmony 
is a situation where couples have been in different direction in not only 
spousal but also religious life. What they assumed might be pertinent 
with the concept of harmony which, in fact, is defined as an ordered 
relationship linked to three aspects of sociocultural context, namely 
culture, spirituality and mental health.35 Arguing that the difference in 
faith is an inditaction of disordered relationship within family, 
particularly spouses, in spiritual aspect, divorce is therefore inevitable. 
Other Muslim countries apply similar regulation in regard to apostasy 
and in almost all Muslim countries, in conversion the laws of 
patriarchy are superseded by the laws of religious affiliation.36 Recently 
to relate to this practice and tendency, a new draft of the Marriage Law 
to be submitted to Parliament by the Ministry of Religious Affairs has 
adopted the dominant position of judges towards this issue, and 
removes the clause and states that apostasy alone, without being 
limited to the existence of disharmony, can break marriages.37 
                                                                
34 Interview with judges of Islamic court of Rangkasbitung and Serang, September 
2012. 
35 Patricia Michelle Eng Hui Yapa and Boon Huat Tanb, ‘Families’ Experience of 
Harmony and Disharmony in Systemic Psychotherapy and Its Effects on Family Life’, 
in Journal of Family Theraphy, 33, 3 (2011). 
36 See Juditth Tucker, Women, Family, and Gender in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) and Lynn Welchmann, Women and Muslim Family Laws in Arab 
States: A Comparative Overview of Textual Development and Advocacy (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2007). 
37 See Draft Hukum Materiil Peradilan Agama (Bidang Perkawinan) being proposed to 
Parliement for it to be nationally discussed and therefore to be nationally enacted as a 
law. 
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Preserving ‘best interest for the child’ religiously’: no custody for 
apostate38 
Another issue that is impacted by the act of apostasy is the issue of 
custody after divorce. It is administered that when parents separate 
children aged below 12 would go with their mothers and those above 
12 can choose one parent with which they will live.39 In Indonesian 
religious court, custody cases can be resolved in two judicial 
procedures as a separated file or as integrated case with divorce file. 
The cases are mostly brought by women where they can face two kinds 
of problems: first to loose the legal right to become custodian of their 
children of the age below 12 and secondly to be not able to execute 
courts’ decisions giving them the right to become custodians. In the 
first case, the problem arises particularly when the man argues that the 
divorce petitions are motivated by the wife’s behavior, including wives’ 
leaving home for work and their religious impiety.40 Some judgements 
in my collections clearly demonstrated the existence of these two kinds 
of issue. 
As in other courts, in Indonesian religious courts judges’ decisions 
about the cases of custody generally stressed the best interest of 
children, but the rulings rest on the perception of individual judges as 
to what constitutes the best of children.41 The notion of the best 
interest of children is highly stressed in the Convention of Right of 
Child (CRC).42 It refers to the idea that children should be best 
protected in terms of financial, physical and psychological aspects and 
                                                                
38  This issue has been discussed in my other article, ‘The Legal Fate of Muslim 
Women in Indonesia,’ in Tim Lindsey and Helen Paushacker (eds), Religion, Law and 
Intolerance in Indonesia (New York: Routledge Press, 2016). 
39 See Kompilasi Hukum Islam, art. 105.  
40 Nurlaelawati, ‘Sharia-based Laws in Indonesia: The Legal Position of Women and 
Children’, in Kees van Dijk, Regime, Change, and Democracy: The Case of Indonesia (Leiden: 
Leiden University Press, 2015), and idem, ‘The Legal Fate of Muslim Women in 
Indonesia: Divorce and Child Custody’, in Tim Lindsey and Helen Paushacker, 
Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia (New York: Routledge Press, 2016). 
41 Nurlaelawati, ‘The Legal Fate of Muslim Women in Indonesia’, 2015. 
42 Article 16 (1) of ICRC states: States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure 
recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the 
upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal 
guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the 
child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern.  
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therefore to the deliberation that courts undertake when deciding what 
type of services, actions, and orders will best serve a child as well as 
who is best suited to take care of a child. However, since every case 
has different character and nature, it is difficult to draw the general 
principle or preposition and the factors or reasons for awarding or 
dismissing custody are varied. 
Therefore, although judges, for example, agree with the rule 
awarding greater right to mother as mentioned above and mostly 
follow it, in practice, judges often conclude that, as the choice of giving 
the right of custodyto one of the divorced parties aims to ensure the 
welfare of the children, it is not always good to give all mothers this 
responsibility without due consideration. Based on the notion of the 
best interest for the children, conversion of the mother to another 
religion is taken as a reason by judges to rob a mother’s right to 
custody.43 The judges’ tendency to put religion in a very high esteem in 
awarding the right to custody basically effects to both man and 
women, but the fact that the state law awards mother greater right has 
disadvantage women more. Therefore, although the laws of religious 
affiliation have mounted in this case of custody retalted to conversion, 
gender inequality which results from the laws of patriarchy takes its 
form. One recent case, involving a woman who after divorce dated 
with a non-Muslim man, clearly demonstrates the prevailing practice 
where the mother was dismissed from her right to custody of her 8 
years old son.44Although the mother fought for her right and filed the 
case to the highest stage, appealing to Supreme Court and referred to 
two principles of the protection of the children’s rights, namely non-
discrimnation and the best interest of the child, she failed to obtain the 
right. Assuming that her dating with a non Muslim man might have 
contaminated the religion of the mother, the Supreme Court 
strengthened the rulings of the lower courts and argued that religion 
(Islam) is a perquisite for one to be awarded right to custody of a 
Muslim child.  
In another case, the religious court of Serang gave the right to 
custody of the children younger than twelve to their father on the basis 
of the consideration that the mother was not pious in her religion and 
                                                                
43 Interview with judges of Islamic courts of Serang and Tangerang, September 2012. 
For the same view on this, see Muhrisun, ‘Apostasy as Gounds in Divorce Cases and 
Child Custody Disputes in Indonesia’, pp. 89-107.   
44 Decision No. 382 K/AG/MA/2012. 
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that all the members of her family were non-Muslims. As a basis for its 
decision, it mentioned the legal doctrine from al-Bajūrī’s Hashiya Kifayat 
al-Akhyar, Vol. 3, 203 stating that “… there is no right to custody for 
the mother who is religiously deviant.” Related to this is that basically 
the kompilasi stipulates that custody of children should be first passed 
to women on the mother’s side if the mother is deemed incapable. 
However, the fact that familial relationships are so close in Indonesia 
as it applies mostly bilateral system of kinship45 provides a foundation 
for some judges to give the right of custody directly to the father, as 
giving it to, for example, an aunt or grandparent on the mother’s side 
can mean in effect still giving it to the mother. It seems that such a 
decision was taken to ensure that the custody of the children, 
particularly in the case where the mother and her family have become 
religiously deviant (fasiq) or apostate, lies in the right hands and that the 
demands of the best interest have been satisfied.46 
Between Religious Protection and Right to Freedom of Religion 
As stated above, while government basically respected religious 
freedom, interfaith relationship continues to be a source of conflict in 
Indonesia. Pressure from society and family is often inevitable as 
shown by the cases disussed above, being varied depending on the 
religious rigidity of family members. Basically, in regard with the rule 
of custody, the Kompilasi Hukum Islam indeed administers that to 
guarantee the safety of the children physically and spiritually, a 
religious court can transfer the right of custody from one nominee to 
others. Although it is not clear whether the spiritual aspects to be 
guaranteed or protected also include (Islamic) religion, judges in the 
religious courts interpret that this is so, and the spiritual safety of the 
children emphasized by them also has a bearing on religious interests 
of the children, This also applies to the case of mumayyiz children 
(those who have reached maturity or those, according to the Kompilasi, 
                                                                
45 It is also interesting that thiskinship system is also detrimental to divorce decsision 
by wives and could be considered as external factor of divorcing. For the extensive 
discussion on this see Euis Nurlaelawati, ‘Muslim Women in Indonesian Religious 
Court: Reforms, Strategies and Pronouncement of Divorce’, Journal of Islamic Law and 
Society, 20, 3 (Leiden: Brill, June 2013).   
46 Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity, p. 145. 
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aged twelve or older),47 and their decision to live with the parent of 
different religion would be therefore ignored.  
Such this legal attitude of judges demonstrates that although a 
number of reforms have been introduced religious doctrines remained 
to be maintained in a very high esteem. It therefore often turned out 
that the practice of Islamic family law often conflicts with current 
international human right norms and standards regarding the equality 
and the protection of dignity of all human beings and their religious 
freedom.48 In fact, the Kompilasi Hukum Islam does not at any level 
provide a base of protecting human right to freedom of religion which 
a parent could refer when petitioning for their right to custody and for 
maintaining their marital bond. Nevertheless, as Indonesia has ratified 
a number of relevant international covenants, including ICCPR, 
CEDAW, and CRC, they could take them as their legal basis. In fact, 
The ICCPR which was ratified by Indonesia in 2006 states that no one 
shall be subject to coercion which would impair (his or her) freedom 
to have or adopt a religion or belief of his (or her) choice (ICCPR art 
18).49 To clarify the article, UN HRC, general comment No. 22 was 
issued and states that governments can limit the right of freedom of 
religion only when it is necessary to protect public safety, public order, 
health, or the fundamental rights and freedom of others. Any 
restriction must be non discriminatory and proportionate.50 Above all 
these international legal standards have been ratified by Indonesia and 
to follow of their ratification Indonesia enacted several laws including 
the Law No. 23/2002 on the Protection of the Children Rights and the 
Law No. 23/2004 on the Elimintaion of all Forms of Violence against 
Women.  
What a litigant as discussed above did when mentioning the 
principles provided in CRC to be refered to in the resolution of her 
custody case shows that some litigants have known the application of 
                                                                
47 For further discussion on this issue, see Euis Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition, 
and Identity, pp. 145-146. 
48 Iris Boussiakou, ‘Religious Freedom and Minority Rights in Greece: the case of the 
Muslim minority in western Thrace’, GreeSE Paper No 21, Hellenic Observatory Papers 
on Greece and Southeast Europe (December 2008), See also Bassam, ‘Islamic 
Law/Shari'a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations’, Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May, 1994), pp. 277-299, p. 1994. 
49 Article 18 of ICCPR. 
50 General Comment No. 22, UN HRC.  
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such principle. Unfortunately, however, the judges, although also 
aware of the existence of the principles, have been reluctant to 
incorporate it in their deciscions.51 This, to my view,, is in line with the 
fact that, as many put it, the right to convert from Islam to another 
religion is held by only a minority of Muslim scholars and that the view 
of religious freedom is not shared by the vast majority of Muslim 
scholars both past as well as present. In fact, while the litigant and her 
lawyer strongly argued that requirement on Islamic faith for one to be 
awarded the right to custody violates the right of freedom to religion 
judges have been very firm about their interpretation of religious 
protection and have ignored their legal and constitutional argument.52 
It seems therefore very clear that the state has limited the right to 
freedom of one’s religious conviction and that human rights are 
determined or restricted by the principle of a particular religion. In this 
contect, we could also opine that the principle of religious protection 
can supersede those introduced by CRC, including the principle of 
non-discrimination. 
The incompatibility of the religious freedom with the precept of 
religious protection in practical level is, I would say, intersected with 
Muslims’ threathened feeling of the danger of Christianixation agenda 
that they think to still run in Indonesia. Therefore, although the state 
law has sought to move away from the classical religious rules in the 
administration of apostasy case as to avoid discrimination and manifest 
the right to religious freedom, it remains difficult for the judges to 
renounce the dogma that Muslims must protect their religion from any 
possible hazard. Such is, as Crouch observed, also evident in the case 
of the children protection related to the proselytization and its limit, 
Crouch proposed the same argument of the religious protection and 
stated that there has been entrenched stereotypes and suspicion of 
Christian activities in Indonesia and that is, she stated, ‘because 
Christian schools are perceived by Muslims as a deceptive means of 
proselytizing Muslim children, seeking converts and therefore 
                                                                
51  See also Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam (Cambridge: 
Islamic Texts Society, 1997), Mahmoud Ayoub,“Religious Freedom and the Law of 
Apostasy in Islam,” Islamochristiana 20 (1994), and Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and 
Coercion in Islam, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
52 For the detailed case, see Nurlaelawati, ‘Legal Fate of Muslim Women in Indonesia’. 
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threatening the future of the Muslim community’.53 Therefore, despite 
that there have been a number of legal attempts to protect minority 
groups’ rights many remained grieved. In addition, as I stated 
elsewhere, although courts’ judges are bound by the state law, they still 
place a high priority on religious values when they come to interpret 
those laws, and this can result in the failure of the elimination of 
discrimination. 
Above all, the majority of judges of the Islamic court have so far 
viewed that they have been provided with special subtstantial 
references and consider that such references as the Law No. 23/2002 
on the Protection of the Children Rights and the Law No. 23/2004 on 
the Elimintaion of all Forms of Violence against Women, which, as 
noted above, were issued to implement concretely the ratification of 
CRC and CEDAW, are not their primary references.54 In fact, they 
rarely, if not never, refer to them.55 Such this attitude might be because 
Indonesia has not taken an appropriate way to follow the ratification. 
Different from, for an example, Morocco that made direct reforms in 
Mudawwana, the special reference of the Muslim judges, to follow its 
ratification of the two international covenants, Indonesia issued new 
laws as the two laws mentioned above.56 Therefore, if Muslim judges in 
Morocco could easily comprehend and refer to the new laws which 
adapt to the rules covered in CRC and CEDAW as the reformed rules 
were incorporated in and added to the Mudawwana, their previous legal 
reference, Muslim judges in Indonesia are challenged to refer to the 
new laws, besides the previously existing laws, the Law of Marriage and 
the Kompilasi Hukum Islam. Given that they are new laws, many judges 
                                                                
53 Crouch, Law and Religion: Conflict and the Court in Indonesia’, p. 96. For more modern 
discussions of this issue and of opnions of some scholars, see Abdullah Saeed and 
Hassan Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam (Michigan: Ashgate, 2004) and 
Mahmoud Ayoub,“Religious Freedom, pp. 73-91. 
54 Interview with judges of Serang, Tangerang and Depok, September 2012.  
55 See Hotnida and Dewi Sukarti, ‘Law in Action: Analisis Implementasi UU No. 23 
Tahun 2002 pada Putusan Hakim dalam Perkara Hadhanah di Pengadilan Agama’, 
Jurnal Alqalam: Jurnal Keagamaan dan Kemasyarakatan (Lemlit IAIN Sultan Maulana 
Hasanuddin Banten 2010) Vol. 27, No. 2. 
56 See John Hursh, ‘Advancong Women‘s Rights through Islamic Law: The Example 
of Morocco’, Berkeley Journal of Gender Law and Justice, 22 (June 2012), pp. 252-305. See 
also Euis Nurlaelawati and Muhrisun, ‘Islam and Children’s Right: The 
Implementation of the Best Interest of the Child in Indonesia and Morocco’, A 
Research Report, The Minsitry of Religious Affairs, Jakarta, 2016. 
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have not yet been aware of their existence and deemed themselves to 
be not bound by those newly issued laws.    
Conclusion 
From the discussion above, a number of conclusions could be 
drawn. First is that Indonesian Islamic law has to some extent made 
reforms on rules of apostasy related to the issue of family. For an 
example, if in classical legal doctrines apostasy is considered to be an 
authomatic ground for marriage dissolution, the Kompilasi Hukum Islam 
puts it as one of divorce grounds, implying that marriage may be 
continued if no party takes the practice of apostasy of one spouse to 
court as divorce grounds. The choice of whether to maintain or 
dissolve marriage is given to the spouses. The freedom is strengthened 
by the character of apostasy where the Indonesian law would not 
terminate the marriage should there has been no disharmony resulting 
from apostasy. The rule of custody does not clearly specify the criteria 
of custodian. In term of religion, for an example, the Kompilasi Hukum 
Islam has not listed Islamic religion or being Muslim as one of the 
conditions upon which mother or father could be awarded the right to 
custody. The mention of the notion of the best interest of the child 
seems to be deemed sufficient to represent the objective of the 
protection of the right of the child. 
Second is that such those reforms have nonetheless not been 
evenly understood and implemented by Muslim judges. The freedom 
of the spouse to decide the fate of their marriage has not been evenly 
considered by Muslim judges and most of them considered apostasy 
itself as ground for divorce. As as result almost all divorces petitioned 
under the ground of apostasy were approved. The same holds also true 
for the case of custody. Muslim judges often robbed the right of non-
Muslim parents, mostly mothers, to custody, of the childrenr aged 12 
who according to the rule should be cared of by their mothers. By 
doing this these judges wanted to protect religion (Islamic) from the 
hazard that would be created. It is safe to argue that when (Islamic) 
religion is chellanged and endangered protection would be made. A 
non-Muslim custodian is therefore dismissed from the right to 
custody, as to those judges awarding the right to custody of the child 
to the non-Muslim parent would disturb and endanger the (Islamic) 
religiousity of the child. 
Third is that although courts’ judges are bound by the state law, 
they still place a high priority on religious values when they come to 
 
 
 
Muslim’s Marital Life in Indonesia 
109 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 10, Number 01, June 2016 
interpret those laws, and this can result in the failure of the elimination 
of discrimination and of the protection of the rights of the pesonals to 
such discussed familial issus as marriage, divorce and child custody. [] 
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